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Based on their projections of the rising costs of healthcare over the
next two decades, the authors set out four difficult choices for
Canadians in the face of this “spending disease.”
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T
he expansion of the scope and
quality of healthcare services,
coupled with apparent low
rates of productivity growth in the
healthcare sector, has meant that the
share of national income devoted to
healthcare has increased substantially
over the last decades.
1
In the United States this share has doubled since
1975, in the United Kingdom it has increased by
over 60 percent, and in Canada it has risen by
over 70 percent, from 7 to 12 percent. In other
words, over the last 35 years or so in Canada, 
we have collectively devoted, on average, roughly
an additional 0.15 percent of national income
each and every year to the consumption of
healthcare services. 
The growth of real per capita expenditures on
healthcare has far exceeded that of personal
income per capita (Figure 1).
2 Expressed differently,
we have chosen to spend, on average, 13 percent
of the increase in our per capita national income,
from 1976 to 2009, on healthcare services. Note
that this collective decision has still left plenty of
additional income each year to be devoted to
consumption of other goods and services, to
investment, and to other public services.
Our demonstrated public and private decisions
to allocate a considerable fraction of rising per
capita national income to healthcare services over
the last 35 years broadly reflects the choice of
Canadians given: a) the rate of growth of national
income; b) the demographic structure of Canada;
c) the relative price of healthcare services;
3 and 
d) the net effect of the expansion of the possible
scope and quality of healthcare services less the
cost-reducing impact of new technologies. Were
these four factors to continue over the next two
decades in the same way as they have over the past
few decades, then there is no reason to think that
it would be unsustainable for the share of national
income devoted to healthcare to continue to rise,
on average, at about 0.15 percentage points 
per year.
4 Indeed, that is what we might expect
given the demonstrated choices that Canadians –
and European and Americans – have made over
the last few decades.
5
Our goal in this paper is twofold: first, to
project the evolution over the next two decades of
healthcare expenditures under a base-case scenario
and an optimistic-case scenario;
6 and, second to
estimate the consequences of the projected growth
rates of healthcare expenditures for private and
public financing, thereby illuminating the difficult
choices that Canadians will have to make, even in
an optimistic scenario. 
Our strategy for projecting healthcare
expenditures consists in combining separate
projections of nominal GDP and the ratio of
healthcare spending to nominal GDP. We begin
by constructing base-case and optimistic-case
projections of nominal GDP growth. The base
case reflects business-as-usual assumptions whereas
the optimistic projection incorporates the assumed
effects of new policy initiatives and structural
changes. We then generate a base-case projection
of Canadian total healthcare spending, both
public and private, as a ratio of GDP to 2031 by
We would like to thank those who reviewed this paper for their enormously helpful suggestions.
1 Labour productivity in the healthcare sector is subject to considerable mis-measurement because of the difficulty of adequately measuring
quality changes, prices and quantities in this sector. For instance, any failure to differentiate between true price increases and improvement in
efficacy and quality would lead to overestimation of the true price of healthcare. See, for instance, Sharpe, Bradley and Messinger (2007).
2 Both healthcare expenditures per capita and personal income per capita are deflated by the price of personal consumption expenditures.
3 This relative price is not the result of purely competitive forces. In part, it reflects the desires and power of providers in a healthcare system in
which political bargaining power and negotiations over administered prices prevail.
4 But “sustainable” does not necessarily imply “optimal” if the delivery system is increasingly inefficient or ineffective.
5 Hall and Jones (2007) shows that if the marginal utility of non-health consumption falls sufficiently rapidly and, as income increases,
healthcare consumption becomes the most valuable channel for spending as it can buy additional years of good life. In this context, a rising
share of income devoted to healthcare spending is a choice of Canadians and not necessarily unsustainable.
6 The model-based methodology underpinning the projections of the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio and the assumptions underlying the
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Figure 1: Index of Total Healthcare Spending and Personal Income
Source: CIHI (2010) and authors’ calculations.
simulating the response of the ratio to the four
drivers mentioned earlier.
7 We also construct an
optimistic projection of the total healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio by evaluating the plausible
effects of new policies and economic developments
as they impart:
￿ a smaller net contribution to expenditure growth
related to the expansion of the scope of services,
less technology-enabled cost reductions;
￿ a reduction in the relative price of healthcare
services; and,
￿ a smaller effect of population aging on 
healthcare spending.
Combining the projected total healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio and nominal GDP, 
each under a base case and an optimistic case,
then results in two projected paths for total
healthcare spending in Canada over the next two
decades. Each represents one possible path: 
the base case is more or less the result of 
business-as-usual assumptions while the optimistic
case assumes unprecedented policy initiatives and
structural change.
Income Growth Projections
Over the longer term, nominal GDP grows at
about the rate of real economic growth, with the
economy operating at full capacity, adjusted for
general inflation and changes in export and
import prices – the terms of trade – as shown in
Table 1. In turn, the rate of economic growth at
full capacity – a concept known as real potential
economic growth – is roughly the sum of the rates
of growth of total hours worked and labour
productivity, at prevailing trends. Under our 
base-case scenario, nominal GDP growth
decelerates from 4.8 percent over the period 2012
to 2016 down to 3.8 percent in the 2020s, largely
as a result of a 0.8 percentage point decline in real
potential growth to 1.8 percent.
8The latter
essentially stems from the aging of the population,
7 Our analysis is akin to a macro “decomposition-of-growth” type of analysis, not one built up from complex micro-foundations. It represents
a generalization of empirical results on the determinants of aggregate healthcare spending over past decades in advanced countries.
8 In this paper, our projections of income and total healthcare spending are broken up in 2016 to allow for a transition between the short term
and the long term in view of the fact that both adjustment to policy changes and the unwinding of short-term shocks take time.Commentary 327 | 3
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which cuts growth in total hours worked by nearly
half between the 2012 to 2016 and 2021 to 2031
periods, via a decline in the aggregate labour force
participation rate (Figure 2).
9 Further, a slight
deceleration of GDP price inflation via slower
terms-of-trade gains contributes to the slowing of
nominal GDP growth, up to 2016.
Under the optimistic case, potential economic
growth barely slows between the 2012 to 2016
and 2021 to 2031 periods, both because of an
assumed larger increase in the participation rate of
the 55 and over population as a result of policy
initiatives and other factors, and because of higher
trend productivity growth as a result of renewed
attempts by the private sector to catch up with a
much higher level of productivity in the United
States. As a result, nominal GDP growth decelerates
much less than in the base case, from about 
5 percent over the 2012-2016 period to 4.5 percent
per year in the 2020s.
Projections of the Total Healthcare
Spending-to-GDP Ratio
Total healthcare spending, combining public and
private expenditures, has tended to rise as a
proportion of GDP since at least the late 1970s.
10
It more or less stabilized from 1983 to 1988 and
declined from 1993 to 1997 as a result of fiscal
retrenchment, but then sprang back to reach a new
high for the whole period in 2009 (Figure 3). Since
1975, healthcare expenditures on average have
grown faster than nominal GDP by 1.7 percentage
points per year, or 8.3 vs. 6.6 percent.
What drives changes in the total healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio over time in our framework
are the following four factors: i) changes in the
age/gender structure of the population; ii) changes
in the relative price of healthcare to GDP; 
iii) changes in the quality and scope of medical
services; and iv) the evolution of real personal
9 A slowdown in the growth rate of the population 15+ also contributes to lower growth in trend total hours, but to a much lesser extent than
the decline in trend labour force participation from the mid-2010s onwards as Table 1 shows.
10 Healthcare expenditures data are from the Canadian Institute for Health Information (2010). These expenditures cover spending related to
hospitals, other institutions, physicians, dental services, vision care services, other professional (health) services, drugs, capital, public health,
administration, health research and other miscellaneous expenditures. 
Table 1: Canada’s Annual Potential Growth – 2009 to 2031
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2009-2012 2012-2016 2016-2021 2021-2031
Growth in Percent
Cyclical Component of GDP 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Population 15+ 1.19 1.06 0.95 0.99
Trend Total Hours 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.5
Optimistic Case 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7
Trend Labour Productivity 1.0 1.5 1.25 1.25
Optimistic Case 1.0 1.5 1.75 1.75
Real Potential Growth 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.75
Optimistic Case 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.5
Domestic Inflation 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Contribution of Terms of Trade 0.5 0.25 0.0 0.0
Nominal GDP Growth 5.25 4.75 4.0 3.75































































































































Figure 2 : Aggregate Labour Force Participation Rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.
income relative to real GDP.
11 On the assumption
that growth in real per capita healthcare
expenditures responds one-for-one to a given
percentage growth in inflation-adjusted per capita
income,
12 changes in real income growth have no
impact on the evolution of the healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio.
13 What an increase
(decrease) in the rate of potential output or
income growth would do, however, is to make
more (less) resources available for the production
and consumption of all public and private goods
and services in the economy. For a given path of
healthcare spending-to-GDP over time, faster
potential economic growth allows faster growth in
public and private spending on non-healthcare
goods and services without increasing private or
public debt relative to GDP.
14
Demographics
Changes in the age-gender structure of the
population affect aggregate real healthcare
expenditures per capita because average healthcare
spending per capita increases rapidly with the age
of the persons beyond a mid-40s age threshold, as
illustrated in Figure 4.
15
11 See Dodge and Dion (2011) for a derivation of this framework.
12 A unit income elasticity of real per capita healthcare expenditures is in the range of empirical estimates based on aggregate data. See, for
instance, Ginsburg (2008) and Smith, Newhouse and Freeland (2009). 
13 Except through possible indirect effects on the growth of the relative price of healthcare to GDP, changes in the quality and scope of medical
services, or the growth of real personal income to GDP. Our projections ignore such possible indirect effects for lack of empirical evidence on
these relationships.
14  On the assumption of a non-unitary income elasticity, the projected fall in real potential growth would have an impact on the growth rate of
the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio. With an elasticity lower than one, the projected fall in real potential growth would give rise to faster
growth in both real per capita healthcare spending and the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio, ceteris paribus. Over history, the contribution
of the residually-determined technology factor to the rise in the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio would be larger than with a unitary
income elasticity. If this larger contribution was maintained over the projection horizon, the paths of real per capital healthcare spending and
healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio would be higher over the next 20 years than under the assumption of a unitary income elasticity. The
converse would hold with an income elasticity greater than one. For more detail, see Dodge and Dion (2011).
15 The projections of population by age and gender groups are from Scenario M1 (medium-growth) of Statistics Canada. See Statistics 
Canada (2010).Commentary 327 | 5
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Figure 4: Healthcare Spending per Capita, by Age Group – 2008
Source: CIHI (2010).
Moreover it does so more slowly for women
than for men up to old age. For example,
healthcare spending per capita associated with the
65-74 age group is larger than that associated with
the 0-44 age group by a factor of 4.6 for males
and 3.2 for females (Table 2 ). A considerable
share of lifetime healthcare expenditures are
incurred not long before a person dies, so an
exponentially rising mortality rate as age increases
beyond a mid-life threshold is a very significant
driver of the age-spending gradient. In our base
case, the 2008 profile of spending by age group is| 6 Commentary 327
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 2: Total Healthcare Expenditures per Capita by Age Group – 2008
Source: CIHI (2010) and authors’ calculations.
Current Dollars Index,Age 0-44 = 1.00
Age Group Males Females Males Females
0-44 1,590 2,030 1.00 1.00
45-64 2,990 2,890 1.88 1.42
65-74 7 ,330 6,400 4.61 3.15
75-84 12,690 12,080 7 .98 5.95
85+ 20,730 23,360 13.04 11.51
16 This is the outcome of lowering the (2008) health cost indexes by 15% in 2021 until 2031 relative to 2016. As a result, the contribution of
changes in the age-gender structure of population to growth in the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio is reduced in the optimistic case
relative to the base case over 2016-2021 but remains unchanged from the base case over 2021-2031, as Table 3 shows. 
17 Work by Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) suggests that when forecasting the impact of aging, policymakers need to adjust for increases in
longevity and health, which they estimate have the effect of cutting the effective speed of aging considerably. Note that the lower morbidity
rates for older groups implied by the optimistic case can be seen as contributing to the higher participation rates of older workers in our
optimistic case for income growth relative to our base case.
18 In more technical economics parlance, this assumes unit elasticities. It is worth noting that real spending is driven by the price of healthcare
consumption relative to the price of total consumption, whereas the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio is driven by the price of healthcare
consumption relative to the price of GDP (Dodge and Dion 2011).
19 An alternative measure of price change in the healthcare sector would reflect a weighted average of the growth rates of the various input
prices net of the growth of total factor productivity in the healthcare sector. Data constraints prevent the estimation of such a measure.
assumed to hold throughout the next two decades.
In our optimistic case, the health cost indexes for
the 65-74 and 75-84 age groups relative to the
benchmark 0-44 age group are smaller on average
by 8 percent over 2016 to 2021, and by 15 percent
over 2021 to 2031.
16 This is consistent with the
assumption that the current 44-65 cohort is in
better health than was the former 44-65 cohort 
of 20 years ago, leading to less healthcare spending
per person than is the case at present when the
current cohort reaches 65-84 years of age over 
the next 20 years.
17 Note that this works through 
a lower morbidity rate rather than a lower
mortality rate.
Relative Price of Health
A change in the relative price of healthcare can
affect total healthcare spending through demand
and supply channels. In this exercise, an increase
(decrease) has no negative (positive) effect on
demand because the latter is assumed to respond
little to changes in relative prices, consistent with
empirical evidence (Smith, Newhouse and
Freeland 2009). In percentage terms, changes in
relative healthcare prices  are expected instead to
be positively reflected on a one-for-one basis
18
in changes in per capita inflation-adjusted
healthcare spending and the healthcare spending-
to-GDP ratio.
The price of healthcare services is proxied by
the National Accounts price of health service
consumption.
19 This price index is essentially
driven by the evolution of wage and salaries in the
healthcare sector and drug prices. Growth in the
measured productivity of healthcare workers is by
assumption close, if not equal, to zero. Relative to
the implicit price of GDP in the National
Accounts, the price of healthcare consumptionCommentary 327 | 7
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rose by 0.7 percent per year from 1991 to 2001,
but edged down on average between 2001 and
2009 because of gains in the terms of trade, which
boosted the price of GDP relative to the price of
consumption, including consumption of
healthcare services. 
In our base case, fiscal austerity and terms-of-
trade gains are projected to further reduce the
relative price of healthcare to GDP by 0.9 percent
per year over the 2010 to 2012 period. This
measure moves to zero percent per year from 2013
to 2016 and returns to its 1991 to 2009 average of
0.2 percent per year thereafter. By implication, the
relative price of healthcare to total consumption
rises by 0.5 percent per year from 2012 to 2016,
and 0.7 percent per year from 2016 to 2031.
In our optimistic case, the price of healthcare
consumption relative to GDP declines by 0.5 percent
per year over 2013 to 2016 and 0.3 percent per
year over 2016 to 2031 as a result of efficiency
gains and possibly slower wage growth in the
healthcare sector relative to the rest of the economy
due to fiscal pressures. By implication, the price of
healthcare relative to total consumption remains flat
over the 2012 to 2016 period and rises by 0.2
percent per year over the years 2016 to 2031.
Technology
Changes in medical technology and practices are
expected to have a material impact on healthcare
spending. For instance, introducing a more
effective but more expensive diagnostic tool for
treatment of a particular disease would generate
increased demand for healthcare services and
boost healthcare costs. This technology factor is
next to impossible to measure directly at the
aggregate level, so its contribution to the growth
rates of both real per capita healthcare spending
and the healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio is
estimated residually instead. After accounting for
growth in per capita personal income, changes in
the age/gender structure of population, and
changes in the relative price of healthcare
consumption to total consumption, the actual
growth rate of real per capita healthcare spending
over 1996 to 2009 leaves a residual of 1.1 percent
per year, which is ascribed to “technology.”
20 This
factor thus accounts for fully one-quarter of the
growth in real per capita healthcare spending over
1996 to 2009. By comparison, technology is
estimated to account for as much as 27 to 48 percent
of the growth in inflation-adjusted, per capita
healthcare spending in the United States over the
1960 to 2007 period (Smith, Newhouse and
Freeland 2009).
21
Being a residual, technology could reflect the
net impact of a variety of factors such as changes
in the scope and quality of healthcare services,
technological improvements in services delivery,
changes in the wellness of the population, changes
in the physician specialty mix, and the potentially
stimulating effect of increased supply of healthcare
resources on the use of healthcare services. However,
we concur with the widespread view that changes
in the scope and quality of the healthcare services,
which are importantly influenced by changes in
medical technology, are the most fundamental
factor underlying the residual. 
In our base projection, the contribution of
technology is assumed to be the same as over 
1996 to 2009 – or each of the 1996-2001 and
2001-2009 periods for that matter – accounting
for about 1.1 percentage points of the annual
growth rates of the healthcare spending-to-GDP
ratio. In our optimistic case, however, such a
contribution is smaller by 25 percent from 2016
to 2021, and 50 percent over 2021 to 2031. These
reductions, which are substantial in view of the
stable contribution of technology over the 1996 
to 2009 period, reflect our judgment that three
factors: i) better price incentives and bottom-up
accountability measures leading to more 
cost-effective treatments and practices; ii) a slower
20 It is worth noting that the importance of the technology factor and the nature of its drivers may differ significantly between the public and
private sectors of the healthcare system. This interesting issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
21 Note, however, that the model used by Smith, Newhouse and Freeland (2009) to extract a technology residual is not identical to the one
used in this study.| 8 Commentary 327
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rate of increase in new procedures and drugs; or
iii) faster creation and diffusion of cost-reducing
technology – could result in a major reduction in
the rate of growth of costs, provided that very
significant efforts are deployed.
Projection Results
In the base case, aging and technology each
account for about half of the annual growth in the
total healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio from
2013 onwards (Table 3). An increase in real
personal income relative to GDP makes an
appreciable contribution over 2001 to 2009, but
its subsequent flat profile has no effect on the
ratio over the projection horizon.
22 Changes in the
relative price of healthcare consumption boost the
ratio by 0.2 percent per year from 2017 onwards.
The healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio rises from
close to 12.0 percent in 2009 to 18.7 percent in
2031 (Figure 5). 
In the optimistic case, the rise in the healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio is more limited than in
the base case but quite significant nonetheless,
since it brings the ratio to 15.4 percent by 2031.
Demographics, relative prices and technology, all
contribute to the lower escalation of the ratio than
in the base case (Table 3).
23
From a policy perspective, one important
outcome of these projections is the very important
role played by technology in driving the healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio. This makes it a key area
for health-policy initiatives aimed at improving
the efficiency of the delivery system and the
incentives for more cost-effective healthcare
intervention, in contrast with aging, which is
equally important but will be little influenced by




Our projections of the healthcare spending-to-
GDP ratio and nominal GDP allow us to extract
the trajectory of healthcare expenditures over the
next two decades. In our base case, the annual
increase in nominal healthcare spending per capita
is set to rise from about $250 in the last decade to
$675 in the 2020s. This would bring total annual
spending per capita after inflation to about
$7,400 in 2021 and $10,700 in 2031, up from
nearly $4,900 in 2009. Even in our optimistic
case the annual increase in current dollars is set to
rise to about $600 in the 2020s. At the same time,
the annual increase in GDP per capita in our base
case climbs from about $1,200 in the last decade
to about $2,200 in the 2020s and in our optimistic
policy-induced case  to about $2,900. The
implication of our base case is that in the 2020s,
Canadians will be spending 31 cents of every
dollar of increase in their nominal incomes on
healthcare, thus bringing the average share of
healthcare spending in GDP up to nearly 17 percent.
Even in our optimistic case, 20 cents of every
additional dollar of income will be directed to
healthcare. These figures contrast with an average
of about 11 cents between 1976 and 2001, but do
not wildly differ from the roughly 20 cents in the
first decade of this century.
In our base case the amount of real additional
per capita income, expressed in constant 2009
dollars, that would be left over each year to be
spent on all other goods and services would fall
over the next two decades from over $1,500 on
average in the years 2010 to 2012, to $1,000 on
average in the years  2021 to 2031, while in our
optimistic case it would rise to $1,600 (Figure 6).
Clearly, this optimistic case is preferable to the base
case but in neither case does the increased
spending on healthcare “eat up” all, or even a
majority of the gains in income. 
22 Except for temporary declines in 2010 and 2011, which show up in Figure 5. The assumed flat profile beyond 2011 ignores the possibility
that shifts in the labour share of income or movements in the terms of trade steer real personal income growth away from real GDP growth.
23 Note that a positive “interaction effect” is tentatively introduced in the projection to mitigate the risk of triple-counting the effect of faster
improvement in cost-reducing technology when adding the three stand-alone cost shocks to generate the optimistic case (see Dodge and
Dion 2011).Commentary 327 | 9
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Table 3: Annual Growth In the Healthcare Spending-to-GDP Ratio 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2001-2009 2009-2012 2012-2016 2016-2021 2021-2031
Growth in Percent
Healthcare Spending/GDP Ratio (Base Case) 2.7 1.1 1.9 2.2 2.4
Optimistic Case 2.7 1.1 1.5 0.4 1.5
Contributions From:
Age-Gender Structure of Population 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1
Optimistic Case 0.7 0.9 0.8 -0.3 1.1
Technology 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Optimistic Case 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.5
Relative Price of Health Care  -0.1 -0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2
Optimistic Case -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3
Real Personal Income/Real GDP 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Optimistic Case 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0



































Figure 5 : Projected Healthcare Spending-to-GDP Ratio 
Source: Authors’ calculations.| 10 Commentary 327
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Even though rising healthcare costs will not eat
up the preponderance of national income
increases over the next two decades, there will
nonetheless be very difficult choices ahead –
especially for Canadian governments who will be
held responsible for providing most of these
services, and for any offloading of costs onto




From 2012 to 2031, the annual growth of
healthcare expenditures averages 6.4 percent in the
base case and 5.8 percent in the optimistic case.
This compares with 4.0 and 4.6 percent,
respectively, for nominal GDP growth. Public and
private spending as shares of additional income
are thus expected to rise substantially in the base
case and quite significantly in the optimistic case. 
Even under an optimistic scenario when
healthcare spending rises by 3.5 percentage points
of GDP over the next two decades, private citizens
will have to devote an increasing share of additional
income to private healthcare insurance, direct 
out-of-pocket expenses on healthcare services, 
and long-term care, assuming no change in the
private-sector share of total healthcare financing. 
In the base case, to prevent the rise in the total
healthcare spending-to-GDP ratio from pushing
up the public debt-to-GDP ratio over the next
two decades, governments will have to increase
their revenues or reduce their non-healthcare
expenditures by the equivalent of about 
4.8 percentage points of GDP if they continue 
to finance about 70 percent of total healthcare
spending.
25 Even in the optimistic case they will
have to find revenue enhancements or expenditure
constraints equivalent to about 2.5 percentage
points of GDP. At the same time, in this




















































Figure 6 : Annual Increase in Real GDP per Capita Available for Non-Health Expenditures 
Note: Author’s calculations (see explanations in text).
24 See also Ragan (2010).
25 Government revenues would increase only slightly faster than nominal GDP on the assumption that the elasticity of revenues to GDP
continues to modestly exceed one. This implies that, other things equal, tax rates would have to increase to prevent a rise in the debt/GDP
ratio in the face of an escalation in the healthcare spending/GDP ratio. On the expenditure side, spending on other programs would have to
increase less rapidly than GDP through cuts in services, increase in labour productivity in the public sector, or compression of public-sector
wages relative to private-sector wages. Commentary 327 | 11
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major overhaul of the healthcare delivery system
and pursue structural policies to increase
productivity and labour force participation,
neither of which will be politically popular.
26
If, after 2014, health-related federal transfers to
the provinces increase at the same rate as Canadian
nominal GDP, then the overall budgetary position
of provincial governments could deteriorate
significantly over the next decades, ceteris paribus.
For example, the Ontario government would see
its healthcare spending rise from about $43.5
billion in 2009 to $154 billion in 2031 if this
spending  was to grow at the same rate as total
Canadian healthcare expenditures in the optimistic
case, or 5.9 percent per annum. If at the same
time health-related federal transfers to Ontario
were to increase at the same pace as Canadian
GDP in the optimistic case, or 4.7 percent per
annum, then the Ontario government would need
to generate additional own-source revenues or
compress non-healthcare program spending by a
substantial amount each year over 2010 to 2031
in order to prevent the rise in the healthcare
spending-to-GDP ratio from pushing up its 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Alternatively, Ontario would
have to reduce the scope of insured services.
Conclusion
Even if we in Canada are incredibly successful in
improving the productivity, efficiency and
effectiveness of the healthcare system – our
optimistic case – we face difficult but necessary
choices as to how we finance the rising costs of
healthcare and manage the rising share of
additional income devoted to it.
In addition to increased spending by individuals
– and employers – for services currently uninsured
by provinces, some combination of the following
actions will be necessary to manage the “spending
disease:”
1)a sharp reduction in public services, other than
healthcare, provided by governments, especially
provincial governments;
2)increased taxes to finance the public share of
healthcare spending;
3)increased spending by individuals on healthcare
services that are currently insured by provinces,
through some form of co-payment or through
delisting of services that are currently publicly
financed; 
4)a major degradation of publicly insured
healthcare standards – longer queues, services of
poorer quality – and the development of a
privately funded system to provide better-quality
care for those willing to pay for it, as in the UK
and many European countries. This “two-tier”
option would not have much effect on the rate of
growth of total spending but, like option 3 above,
would alter the public-private split and have
distributional implications.
None of these options is appealing; there is no
easy way to manage the chronic healthcare
spending rise. In this paper we have attempted to
provide a diagnostic of the spending disease and a
prognosis of its evolution. The prognosis is not
good, even if we are incredibly successful in
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
healthcare delivery. But the spending disease must
be managed. It is now up to Canadians to have an
adult discussion about how to manage it.
26 To compound the problem, global population aging may well put upward pressure on long-term interest rates and hence intensify debt
service costs over the next 40 years (Takats 2010). The rationale is “that house prices are determined jointly with financial asset prices. Hence,
if house prices face headwinds, so should financial asset prices” (Takats 2010, p.3). With aging, the proportion of the population that dissaves
or saves relatively little and thereby sells assets (housing and financial) to finance retirement increases.| 12 Commentary 327
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